I. Admiralty by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 2 Article 5
Spring 3-1-1977
I. Admiralty
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Admiralty Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




The Fourth Circuit recently considered several important ques-
tions of admiralty law. In I. T. 0. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board' and
Norfolk, B. & C. Lines v. Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs,2 the court interpreted the coverage and benefits provisions
of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA) . The court also considered Jones Act
coverage4 of bridgeworkers in Whittington v. Sewer Construction
Co.,I and the duty of the Coast Guard to mark wrecks under the 1965
amendments to the Wreck Removal Acts' in Lane v. United States.7
Finally, in Oriente Commercial, Inc. v. MIV Floridian,, the Fourth
Circuit explored the intricacies of maritime lien priority law and the
Ship Mortgage Act.
A. Extended Coverage and Benefits under the 1972 Amendments
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
The 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act of 1927 (LHWCA)I° were intended to revitalize
the existing compensation scheme for longshoremen." Notable bene-
1 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on rehearing en banc,
542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976).
2 539 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977)
(No. 76-658).
Act of October 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251, amending 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1970) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. V 1975)).
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
541 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1976).
£ 14 U.S.C. § 86 (Supp. V 1975); 33 U.S.C. §§ 409, 414 (1970).
529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975).
A 529 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. i975).
46 U.S.C. §§ 951-954 (1970).
, Act of October 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251, amending 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1970) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. V 1975)).
" See H.R. No. 1441, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE,
CONG. & AD. NEws 4698 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. See generally Doak &
Hecker, Is it a New Ball Game?-The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 11 FORUM 544 (1976); Gorman, The Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J.
MARITIME L. & CoM. 1 (1974); Note, Maritime Jurisdiction and Longshoremen's
Remedies, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 649.
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fit changes included increases in weekly disability compensation,'
2
death benefits,'3 student benefits,'" and the allowance for funeral ex-
penses. 5 Additionally, the 1972 amendments expanded LHWCA cov-
erage previously confined to injuries occurring over navigable wa-
ters." The Act presently provides compensation for injuries taking
place on adjoining land areas which customarily are used in loading,
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel. 7 The amendments also
require that an injured employee be engaged in "maritime employ-
ment."' 8 Thus, the LHWCA now conditions compensation coverage
upon satisfaction of both a situs and a status test.
Proper application of the dual situs and status test was the pri-
mary issue in I. T. 0. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board'" and its com-
panion cases."0 The Fourth Circuit held that dock workers injured
12 33 U.S.C. §§ 906-908 (Supp. V 1975).
13 Id. § 909.
" Id. § 902(18).
,s Id. § 909(a).
" The 1927 Act provided in part: "Compensation shall be payable under this
chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee but only if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United
States .. " 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970). The phrase "upon the navigable waters" has
been held not to include piers and wharves or other fixtures permanently attached to
land. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969); Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969); Labit v. Carey Salt Co., 421 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1970);
Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1051 (1968);
Houser v. O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 954 (1968).
,1 The amended statute retains the wording of the original Act, but new language
expands the concept of "navigable waters" to include "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used
by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing or building a vessel." 33 U.S.C. §
903(a) (Supp. V 1975).
'" "Maritime employment," as described in the statute, covers longshoremen and
harbor workers, including ship repairmen, shipbuilders, and shipbreakers. Id. § 902(3).
Under the original Act, a broader definition of "employee" included anyone except "a
master or member of a crew of any vessel" or persons engaged in loading, unloading,
or repairing a vessel under 18 tons. Id. § 902(3).
The amendments retained the employer's requirement to have at least one em-
ployee engaged in work of a maritime nature, which must be performed partly "upon
the navigable waters of the United States." Id. § 902(4) (Supp. V 1975). Navigable
waters in this context also includes piers, wharves, and adjoining land areas. The
employer requirement, however, is no longer material under the amendments since the
employee himself is now required to be engaged in maritime employment.
" 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on rehearing en banc,
542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976).
20 The following cases were combined in LT. 0. for appeal to the Fourth Circuit:
Harris v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 BRBS 301 (1975); Brown v. Maritime Terminals,
Inc., 1 BRBS 212 (1974); Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp., 1 BRBS 199 (1974).
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while transferring goods from one point on a pier to another pier
location, or from a pier to a delivery truck, were not engaged in
maritime employment.2 ' The court concurred in the Benefits Review
Board22 determination that the injuries occurred over navigable wa-
ters as defined in the amendments.2 However, the Review Board's
application of the maritime employment status test was reversed.
2'
The Board had held that any job which is an integral part of the
overall process of loading or unloading a vessel qualifies the employee
as a maritime employee within the meaning of the amendments.2
The Fourth Circuit instead determined that only those employees
engaged in moving cargo from the ship to the first point of storage
on the pier, or from the last point of storage on the pier to the ship,
could be categorized as maritime employees.
26
22 In Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp., 1 BRBS 199 (1974), the plaintiff was a forklift opera-
tor at Dundalk Marine Terminal in Baltimore where he was injured while moving a
load of brass tubing from a warehouse to a delivery truck. The tubing had arrived seven
days earlier in a container. The storage shed was 685 feet from the water.
The plaintiff in Brown v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 BRBS 212 (1974), was a
forklift operator at Norfolk International Terminals in Norfolk, where he suffered
carbon monoxide poisoning. Brown was engaged in moving loads from warehouse stor-
age to containers for loading. The warehouse was 805 feet from the water.
In Harris v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 BRBS 301 (1975), the claimant was a
"hustler" driver at Norfolk International Terminals. Harris was injured when the
brakes failed on the hustler he was operating. His job consisted of moving containers
from the storage area to the container marshalling area adjacent to the pier. At the
time of the injury, no ship was present at the pier.
22 The Benefits Review Board was created by the 1972 amendments to sit as an
appellate tribunal for claims brought under the LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (Supp.
V 1975). This task of reviewing decisions by administrative law judges, who sit as
courts of the first instance, formerly belonged to the federal district courts. Decisions
by the Board may be appealed directly to the Court of Appeals in the circuit where
the injury occurred. Id. § 921(c). For an authoritative article by the chairperson of the
Review Board discussing appellate procedure, see Washington, Benefits Review
Board's New Appellate Process Under the Longshoremen's Act, 11 FORUM 686 (1976).
2 529 F.2d at 1083-84.
24 Id. at 1084, 1087-88.
" Harris v. Maritime Terminals, Inc., 1 BRBS 301,304 (1975); Brown v. Maritime
Terminals, Inc., 1 BRBS 212, 214 (1974); Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp., 1 BRBS 199, 202
(1974).
21 529 F.2d at 1087-88. The court emphasized that the test would apply to some
workers who never crossed the line into the sphere of navigable waters, but whose work
took place wholly on land. This applies, however, only to those workers engaged in
moving the cargo from its immediate point of rest alongside the ship to its initial place
of storage. Id. at 1088. See generally Note, Admiralty Law/Workmen's Comensa-
tion-On the Waterfront: The Fourth Circuit Draws the Line at the Point of Rest in a
Narrow Interpretation of the LHWCA Amendments of 1972, 54 N.C.L. REv. 925 (1976).
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The Fourth Circuit's "point of rest" test27 was derived primarily
from the legislative history of the amendments.2 The House Commit-
tee on Education and Labor29 stated that the LHWCA was amended
to provide uniform compensation for long-shoring "employees who
would otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their activity."3
This statement was illustrated by the example of an employee mov-
ing cargo from a ship to a storage area on the pier." Under the 1927
Act, that employee would be covered only while aboard the ship or
on the gangplank,32 while the 1972 amendments would cover the long-
shoreman's activity on the adjoining pier as well." Congress intended
that longshoremen's compensation no longer should depend upon the
"fortuitous circumstances of whether the injury occurred on land or
over water."34
The Fourth Circuit interpreted the language of the congressional
reports to indicate that LHWCA coverage extends only to the imme-
diate process of loading and unloading a ship. The "point of rest"
doctrine consequently was devised by the court as a test for determin-
ing LHWCA coverage of an injured longshoreman. 5 The doctrine is
based on the presumption that cargo enters maritime commerce at
the moment it is picked up from its last "point of rest" and loaded
onto the ship. Similarly, cargo ceases to be in maritime commerce
The majority's analysis was labeled the "point of rest" test by the dissent. 529
F.2d at 1089 (Craven, J., dissenting).
1 The House Committee on Education and Labor reported that the new situs test
was necessitated by the increasing use of modem containerized cargo, resulting in more
longshoring work on shore. For this reason, the definition of "navigable waters" was
expanded to include piers, wharves, and other adjacent land areas. HousE REPORT,
supra note 11, at 10, 4708. The report explained that coverage was not intended to
extend to employees merely because they happened.to be injured in the adjoining land
area. The employees must be engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a
vessel to qualify for compensation. The worker who picks up cargo for overland trans-
shipment was given as an example of an employee not covered. Clerical employees also
were listed as employees unable to benefit from the Act. HousE REPORT, supra note
11, at 10,4708.
" The House and Senate Reports are virtually identical. Compare H.R. REP. No.
1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEws 4698 with
S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
10 HousE REPORT, supra note 11, at 10,4708.
31 Id.
32 See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969); O'Keeffe v. Atlan-
tic Stevedoring Co., 354 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1965); O'Loughlin v. Parker, 163 F.2d 1011
(4th Cir. 1947).
3 See note 17 supra.
1, House REPORT, supra note 11, at 10,4708.
1 529 F.2d at 1088. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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when placed at its first point of rest after being removed from the
ship."6
Judge Craven dissented from the majority's holding, and consid-
ered the majority's application of the 1972 amendments too constric-
tive.37 He contended that the terms "longshoremen," "maritime em-
ployment," and "loading and unloading" have established meanings
which obviate the need to look for further legislative guidance. In
particular, courts often have been called upon to construe "loading
and unloading" in the context of tort actions against ship owners for
injuries sustained in the ship's service.39 Judge Craven argued that,
in these cases, courts consistently have interpreted "loading and un-
loading" to include all employees engaged in the overall process of
moving cargo between the waterfront and the ship." Moreover, the
dissent noted that the Fourth Circuit itself has followed this approach
in similar cases."1
u See 529 F.2d at 1095 (Craven, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 1094 (Craven, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 1097 (Craven, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent noted that
"maritime employment" is intended to encompass all work done over navigable wa-
ters. "On the basis that there can be nothing more maritime than the sea, every
employment on the sea or other navigable water[s] [sic] should be considered as
maritime employment." 529 F.2d at 1090 n.2, quoting E. JHiRAD, 1A BaNEDiar ON
ADMIRALTY § 17 (7th ed. 1973, Supp. 1975) (emphasis in original). Judge Craven sug-
gested that in view of the expanded concept of "navigable waters" in the 1972 amend-
ments, see note 16 supra, the concept of "maritime employment" should be expanded
correspondingly. 529 F.2d at 1090 n.2 (Craven, J., dissenting).
" 529 F.2d at 1097 (Craven, J., dissenting). The "loading and unloading" question
arose in the context of unseaworthiness claims by longshoremen against shipowners.
In Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), the Supreme Court held
that admiralty jurisdiction obtains when a shipowner commits a tort while the ship is
being loaded or unloaded and the impact is felt ashore at a time and place not remote
from the wrongful act. The claimant in that case was injured on shore when he slipped
on loose beans that had spilled from defective cargo container bags. Holding that the
cargo bags were an appurtenance of the ship, the Court concluded that jurisdiction
could be predicated upon the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970), and
that the unseaworthiness doctrine could be invoked because claimant was in the pro-
cess of loading or unloading the ship. 373 U.S. at 207, 209, 214-15.
"o See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Chagois v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1970); Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3rd
Cir. 1965); Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1964); Olvera v.
Michalos, 307 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
11 See Garrett v. Gutzeit, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974), where the claimant was
injured by a defective bale of pulp paper while stacking recently unloaded bales in a
pierside warehouse. In concluding that the plaintiff could invoke the seaworthiness
warranty, the court noted:
The [district] court apparently concluded that "unloading" ceases
when the cargo is no longer in contact with the ship, i.e., when the
1977]
432 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
The dissent proposed four procedural reasons why the Review
Board's decision should be affirmed. First, the remedial nature of the
statute requires a liberal interpretation to assure that the congres-
sional purpose of eliminating disparity in benefits is accomplished.42
Second, the Act creates a presumption that a claimant will fall within
the coverage of the Act absent substantial evidence to the contrary."
Third, the Supreme Court has held that great deference should be
given to consistent construction of a statute by the agency charged
with its enforcement." Finally, Judge Craven argued that courts his-
torically have confined themselves to a narrow scope of review of
decisions under the LHWCA; accordingly, the Board's rulings should
be conclusive unless the decision has no basis in law or fact.
5
Judge Craven's dissent has received a great deal of attention from
other circuits confronting the same issue of LHWCA coverage." The
First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have rejected the "point of
rest" theory and have established a "total process of loading and
unloading" test consonant with the liberal remedial purposes of the
1972 amendments. 7 The circuit courts relied substantially on the
bales were deposited on the pier and discharged from the ship's
gear. . . . [W]e believe that the case law rejects such a narrow defi-
nition of "unloading."
. . .In view of the obvious trend to fully develop the humanitar-
ian purposes of the warranty of seaworthiness we find no reason to
apply a hypertechnical definition to the terms loading and unloading.
Id. at 234-35.
11 529 F.2d at 1091 (Craven, J., dissenting). See note 28 supra. See also Reed v.
The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963); Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 334 (1953); Pillsbury
v. United Eng'r. Co., 342 U.S. 197, 200 (1952).
,1 529 F.2d at 1091 (Craven, J., dissenting); 3"3 U.S.C. § 920 (1970) provides in
part: "In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this
chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the con-
trary-(a) That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter." See, e.g.,
African Overseas Constr. Co. v. McMullen, 500 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1974); Friend v.
Britton, 220 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955); Hartford Accident
and Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940).
,1 529 F.2d at 1091 (Craven, J., dissenting); see, e.g., NLRB v. Boeing, 412 U.S.
67, 75 (1973).
1 529 F.2d at 1093-94 (Craven, J., dissenting); see, e.g., O'Loughlin v.,Parker, 163
F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1947).
" See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 52 n.20, (2d Cir.
1976); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d
629, 638-39 (3rd Cir. 1976); Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 4 BRBS 304, 311 (1st
Cir. 1976).
11 After the Fourth Circuit's decision in L T. 0., the Benefits Review Board rejected
that court's narrow interpretation of maritime employment and continued to apply a
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expressed legislative intent to provide uniform coverage of longshore-
men whether working on vessels or in adjoining land areas."8 In
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura,45 the Second Circuit held
that the 1972 amendments extend LHWCA benefits to workers who
meet the situs requirement and are engaged in stuffing or stripping
containers" or generally handling cargo between a trans-shipment
vehicle and the ship.5 1 The case involved a claimant who slipped on
ice while checking a container on the pier, and a claimant who was
injured while loading cheese on a truck for trans-shipment. All of the
arguments raised in Judge Craven's IT. 0. dissent were asserted be-
fore the Second Circuit in Pittston. The court rejected the
test based on the total process of loading and unloading. In the weeks immediately
following the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Board decided three cases with facts simi-
lar to those in I.T.O.: Perez v. United Terminals, Inc., 3 BRBS 368 (March 30, 1976);
Cabera v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 3 BRBS 297 (March 10, 1976); Bradshaw v. J. A.
McCarthy, Inc., 3 BRBA 195 (Jan. 26, 1976). In Bradshaw, the Board indicated that
it was
well aware of the restrictive interpretation given the status require-
ment by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. . . . However, we are
of the opinion that our interpretation with regard to coverage is more
in keeping with the amended statute and the legislative history, and
we will continue to follow the line of reasoning developed in previous
decisions ...
3 BRBS at 198.
See also Toomer v. Machinery Rental, 3 BRBS 220 (A.J) (Jan. 28, 1976); Fanelli v.
Universal Terminal and Stevedoring Corp., 3 BRBS (ALJ) (Jan. 16, 1976).
1 Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 540 n.21 (5th Cir. 1976);
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 54 (2d Cir. 1976); Sea-Land
Serv., Inc. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 637 (3rd Cir.
1976); Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 4 BRBS 304, 320 (1st Cir. 1976).
" 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub nom., Northeast Maritime
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 45 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1976) (No. 76-444), Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co. v. Blundo, 45 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1976) (No.
76-454).
" Container stuffers and strippers are workers who load goods into, and unload
goods from containers.
51 Upon analyzing congressional committee reports to determine the purpose of
the 1972 amendments, the Second Circuit arrived at two conclusions. First, Congress
was concerned that modern containerization and LASH-type vessels (LASH vessels
transport pre-"stuffed" lighters rather than containers) have required the movement
of an increasing number of traditional longshoring jobs ashore. 544 F.2d at 53. Second,
Congress intended to provide uniform coverage for persons engaged in loading or un-
loading functions on piers. Id. at 54. The court found that these conclusions indicated
congressional intent to extend the Act's coverage to workers stuffing or stripping con-
tainers, and to workers handling cargo within adjoining land areas. The court noted
that coverage for the latter category of workers might be conditioned upon a showing
that the employee has spent a significant portion of his time working aboard vessels.
However, the court reserved decision on this point for a later date. Id. at 56.
1977]
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"deference" argument, the "presumption" argument, and the argu-
ments based on definitions of terms, such as "loading and unload-
ing," as defined in other contexts. The court chose to rely on congres-
sional intent and the principle of liberal construction of remedial
legislation." Thus, the Pittston court permitted LHWCA coverage of
claimants who would have been denied recovery under the Fourth
Circuit test. The Second Circuit rejected the "point of rest" test as
incongruent with the legislative purpose of providing uniform cover-
age to longshoremen.
3
Uniformity of coverage likewise was emphasized by the Third
Circuit in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Office of Workers' Compensa-
tion Programs." In Sea-Land, the Third Circuit held that a truck
driver, injured when his truck turned over on a public road, was
covered by the LHWCA if he was merely transporting ship's cargo
from one point of the sprawling Port Elizabeth to another.55 The case
was remanded for additional findings of fact to determine what type
of freight, if any, was on the truck at the time of the accident."
Nevertheless, the court rejected the "point of rest" doctrine of LT. 0.
and championed the dissenting opinion of Judge Craven.
57
Similarly, in the First Circuit case of Stockman v. John T. Clark
& Son,58 the "point of rest" analysis was discarded in favor of the
Second Circuit's Pittston approach. The First Circuit held that the
claimant, injured while stripping a container, was a maritime em-
ployee within the meaning of the Act, and therefore entitled to
11 Id. at 48-51, see text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
53 Id. at 52.
" 540 F.2d 629 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Id. at 639.
5, Id. at 639-40.
s The Third Circuit, like the Second, relied substantially on the expressed legisla-
tive intent to provide uniform coverage of longshoremen whether working on vessels
or in adjoining land areas. The court held that location of an employee injury at some
point remote from the pier is immaterial as long as the employee is engaged in moving
cargo within the terminal. Id. at 639. In rejecting the "point of rest" analysis, the Third
Circuit cited the dissent in L T. 0. for language encouraging adoption of a total process
of loading and unloading test. By this analysis, longshoring is viewed as an uninter-
rupted process which continues at all times while the cargo is in maritime commerce
as distinguished from land commerce. Id. Accordingly, the Third Circuit drew the line
of coverage at the point where cargo passes between an employer engaged in maritime
commerce and an employer engaged in land commerce. At this point, the court rea-
soned, the functional relationship of the employee's activity to maritime transporta-
tion becomes clear. Thus, the parameters for LHWCA coverage should be drawn
"where cargo is delivered to a segregated place for delivery to the next mode of trans-
portation." Id.
5 4 BRBS 304 (lst Cir. 1976).
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LHWCA benefits." As in Pittston,"0 the arguments made by Judge
Craven in his .T. 0. dissent were presented before the Stockman
court. The First Circuit remained unmoved by the "presumption,"
"deference," and definition of terms arguments,6' but like the Second
Circuit, proceeded to find LHWCA coverage on the basis of legisla-
tive intent to provide uniformity of coverage. 2
The Fifth Circuit also considered congressional intent in
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue." The Fifth Circuit, however,
did not emphasize the notion of uniform coverage." Rather, the court
relied on other language in the House Report to hold that an injured
worker is covered if engaged in or "directly involved" in loading,
unloading, repairing, breaking, or building a vessel. 5 The "point of
rest" doctrine was rejected in the absence of explicit language creat-
ing such a restrictive application of a remedial statute. Instead, the
court applied the general rule that remedial statutes should be liber-
ally construed." The Fifth Circuit's liberal application of its "direct
5, 4 BRBS at 321-22.
See note 51 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 42-45, 51 supra.
" 4 BRBS at 320; see 529 F.2d at 1095, 1097.
' 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub nom. P. C. Pfeiffer Co.
v. Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976) (76-641). Five cases were combined on
appeal from the Benefits Review Board award of compensation to all of the plaintiffs
below. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the awards to three of the plaintiffs: an employee
injured while securing to a flatcar a vehicle which had been moved from the ship to a
storage area before being taken to the flatcar, P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, No. 75-2289,
539 F.2d at 543; an employee injured in a fabrication shop while building a piece of
woodwork that was to be installed in a new ship, Halter Marine Fabricators, Inc. v.
Nulty, No. 75-2317, id. at 543; and an employee, a "cotton header," who was injured
while unloading bales of cotton from dray wagons and stacking them in a pierside
warehouse, Ayers S.S. Co. v. Bryant, No. 75-4112, id. at 544. The court reversed the
awards to: a worker injured while going to "punch out" on his employer's time clock
at the end of the work day at a location' removed from the waterfront, Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, No. 75-1659, id. at 541; and an employee injured while
tearing down a building at an unused marine facility, Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v.
Skipper, No. 75-2833, id. at 542.
" Id. at 541 n.21.
" Id. at 539-40. The court considered committee report language concerning ex-
amples of employees not covered by the Act:
Thus, employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo
for further trans-shipment would not be covered, nor would purely
clerical employees whose jobs do not require them to participate in the
loading or unloading of cargo. However, checkers, for example, who
are directly involved in the loading or unloading function are covered
by the new amendment.
HousE REPORT, note 11 supra, at 11,4708 (emphasis added).
" In rejecting the "point of rest" approach, the Fifth Circuit relied on the intent
1977]
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involvement" test obtains results comparable to the "overall process"
test as applied by the Benefits Review Board and the other circuits."
In both instances coverage is extended to workers handling cargo in
intra-terminal movement up to the point of overland trans-
shipment.68 Thus, the Jacksonville decision also rejected the .T.O.
"point of rest" analysis.
The Fourth Circuit reconsidered its original . T. 0. decision upon
rehearing en banc.69 A divided court briefly considered the issue of
LHWCA coverage0 and reversed its earlier decision.7' A test devised
to provide uniform coverage for longshoremen in addition to the rule that remedial
statutes are to be liberally construed. 539 F.2d at 541 n.21; see also Voris v. Eikel, 346
U.S. 328 (1953).
"7 See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
" The Fifth Circuit applied its "direct involvement" analysis to plaintiff Ford, see
text accompanying note 65 supra, who was engaged in securing vehicles to flatcars in
preparation for their trans-shipment. The vehicles had previously been unloaded from
a ship and taken to a storage area, where they had remained for several days before
being loaded onto the flatcars. The court held that Ford was directly involved in the
process of moving maritime cargo from a ship to land transportation. 539 F.2d at 543.
" 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976).
Upon rehearing, the Fourth Circuit also considered whether the Director of the
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs [OWCP] should be named as a respon-
dent in appeals of Benefits Review Board decisions. In the original I.T.O. case, the
Benefits Review Board was named as a respondent along with the injured claimant
Adkins. The Board moved to be dismissed from the proceedings and further moved
that the Director of OWCP be substituted as respondent. 529 F.2d at 1088. The switch
would be nominal only, for the Review Board, as an arm of the Department of Labor,
33 U.S.C. § 921 (Supp. V 1975), is represented by the Solicitor of Labor, who also
represents the Director of OWCP. See Washington, Benefits Review Board's New
Appellate Process Under the Longshoremen's Act, 11 FORUM 686, 695 (1976). Despite
the actual inconsequential effects of replacing the Board by the Director, the Board
prefers not to be a party because of the conceptual difficulties resulting. Requiring the
Board to appear as a party is analogous to requiring a district court to appear and
defend its decisions on appeal. Id. at 694, quoting McCord v. Benefits Review Bd., 514
F.2d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The Fourth Circuit granted the Board's motion to be dismissed, but denied the
motion to substitute the Director of OWCP as respondent. 529 F.2d at 1084. In dismiss-
ing the Board, the court relied on McCord v. Benefits Review Bd., 514 F.2d 198 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). The District of Columbia Circuit had held in McCord that the statute
creating the Board, 33 U.S.C. § 921 (Supp. V 1975), did not compel the Board to be a
party in appeals. Moreover, the McCord court held that sufficient adversity existed
between the employer and employee to insure proper litigation without the Board's
participation. 514 F.2d at 200. The Fourth Circuit considered this reasoning equally
applicable to the Director of OWCP, and refused to allow his substitution as respon-
dent on this basis. 529 F.2d at 1089.
In the LT. 0. rehearing, the Fourth Circuit affirmed its earlier decision that the
Director is not a necessary respondent in LHWCA appeals. 542 F.2d at 906. The court
pointed out that the Review Board is not like other administrative agencies in that the
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by Judge Widener emerged as the basis for reversal without explicit
approval by a majority of the court. The test is based on the principle
expressed in the original LT. 0. decision, but is augmented by a re-
vised "point of rest. 7 2 The earlier . T. 0. holding placed the crucial
"point of rest" at the cargo's first storage point after being unloaded
from the ship.13 The new test moves the "point of rest" landward to
the cargo's last storage point before trans-shipment overland. 7 This
revision expands LHWCA coverage to include container stuffers and
-strippers,75 as well as other handlers of cargo in intra-terminal move-
ment. The court, however, implied that only cargo movement which
is an essential step in the overall loading or unloading process would
Act creating the Board does not on its face make the Director a respondent on appeals.
Id. at 906-07. Moreover, the court determined that the LHWCA is not analogous to
other agency-creating statutes because the Act provides for adjudication of claims
between two private parties, not between one private party and the government. Id.
at 907 n.4. Hence, the adversity that exists between a claimant and the Federal Com-
munications Commission, or a claimant and the Federal Power Commission, is not
present here. Id. But see Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 42
n.5 (2d Cir. 1976).
Having determined that the Director has no statutory right to be a party to a BRB
appeal, the court considered alternatively if he had been "adversely affected or ag-
grieved by a final order of the Board" within the meaning of § 921(c). 542 F.2d at 907.
The en banc court decided that the Director did not have the requisite stake in the
proceedings to be considered adversely affected or aggrieved. Id. at 908. But see Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 546 (5th Cir. 1976). Although the
Fourth Circuit refused to consider the Director a necessary party, both . T. 0. decisions
made clear that the Director may intervene in such cases and that the application for
intervention ordinarily will be granted. Id. at 909.
11 Id. at 905. Upon rehearing en banc, Judges Russell, Winter, and Haynesworth
subscribed to the majority opinion in the earlier IT. 0. decision, while Judges Craven
and Butzner dissented. Judge Widener divided his vote between the two sides. Judge
Widener voted with the dissent in regard to plaintiffs Harris and Brown, see note 21
supra, which resulted in an evenly divided bench. Thus, the earlier Fourth Circuit
reversal of the Harris and Brown holdings by the Benefits Review Board was replaced
by an affirmative judgment. However, Judge Widener sided with the majority on the
Adkins case, which effected its reversal. Consequently, Judge Widener's test was deci-
sive. Unfortunately, the court did not explain the test in detail, and Judge Widener
did not write a separate opinion.
72 542 F.2d at 905.
529 F.2d at 1088.
n The court explained that under the new test, coverage ends at the last point
where the cargo is stored within the terminal before being placed directly into an
overland carrier. 542 F.2d at 905. Thus, a worker moving cargo from a storage place in
the terminal onto a truck for land shipment is not covered. Id. Likewise, a-worker
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be covered by the Act.77 Consequently, under the Fourth Circuit 'en
banc decision, the LHWCA covers any injuries which occur during
necessary intra-terminal movement of cargo between the ship and the
point of storage immediately preceding or following overland trans-
port.7
8
The court's cursory treatment of Judge Widener's test renders
analysis of the holding difficult. However, the I. T. 0. revised standard
of coverage appears more comparable to the interpretations of
LHWCA coverage by other circuits than the original "point of rest"
standard. The Second Circuit in Pittston held that all intra-terminal
movement of cargo, including stripping or stuffing containers, be-
tween the ship and the overland trans-shipment vehicle, is within the
Act's coverage.79 In Sea-Land, the Third Circuit held that the bound-
ary of coverage should be placed where the cargo is delivered to a
segregated location for transfer to the next mode of transportation."0
The First Circuit's decision in Stockman, based primarily on
Pittston, 8 specifically determined that container stuffers are covered
by the LHWCA even if never required to work aboard a vessel."
Finally, the Fifth Circuit held in Jacksonville that workers "directly
involved" in loading or unloading are eligible for compensation even
if injured while loading goods onto an overland shipment vehicle."
All of the courts seem to agree that coverage should extend to
employees handling cargo up to the point where the cargo begins its
movement in overland commerce. However, the circuits do not agree
on the precise point where coverage begins or ceases. The Fourth
Circuit draws the line where the cargo is in its last resting place in
the terminal. Further movement into the trans-shipment vehicle is
not part of maritime commerce and hence does not involve maritime
employment.84 However, the Second Circuit held that any handling
" In discussing the application of the Act to plaintiff Harris, see note 21 supra,
the court stated: "The goods were being moved solely for loading purposes, not for mere
convenience, and therefore . . . Harris . . . was engaged in the overall process of
loading the ship." 542 F.2d at 905 (emphasis added).
7X Id.
7, 544 F.2d at 56.
540 F.2d at 639.
4 BRBS at 321-24.
Id. at 324.
0 542 F.2d at 905.
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 56 (2d Cir. 1976). The
Second Circuit stated that a worker engaged in handling cargo in circumstances such
as loading goods onto a mode of land transport, comes within the coverage of the
amended Act, provided he has spent "a significant part of his time in the typical
longshoring activity of taking cargo on or off a vessel." Id. However, the court indicated
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of cargo, including loading the trans-shipment vehicle, which occurs
prior to the actual movement of the vehicle from the terminal, consti-
tutes maritime employment." Similarily, the Fifth Circuit held that
an employee injured on a railroad car while loading cargo for trans-
shipment was engaged in maritime employment." The Third Circuit
did not consider this specific issue, but the court's language stating
that the coverage line should be set "where cargo is delivered to a
segregated place for delivery to the next mode of transportation"87
indicates that the court may agree with the Fourth Circuit's recovery
line. The Fourth Circuit's LT. 0. decision upon rehearing served to
expand the court's earlier restrictive interpretation of LHWCA cover-
age. This result was a substantial step toward bringing the Fourth
Circuit within the growing consensus among the circuits establishing
appropriate coverage standards for the 1972 LHWCA amendments.
A different aspect of the 1972 amendments was at issue in
Norfolk, B. & C. Lines v. Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs.8" The 1972 amendments substantially increased death
benefits" and liberalized the requirements for eligibility to recover
that the proviso was not essential to the Pittston holding, and reserved decision on the
question for another time. Id.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 543 (5th Cir. 1976).
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d
624, 639 (3d Cir. 1976).
- 539 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan.'25, 1977)
(76-658).
81 33 U.S.C. § 906(d) (Supp. V 1975). Under the former provisions, a widow could
receive weekly compensation at a maximum rate of only 35% of the decedent's average
wages, and children were limited to 15% of the average wages. The funeral expense
allowance was $400. 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1970). The 1972 amendments increased these
benefits to 50% for the widow, 16 2/3% for the children, and a funeral expense allow-
ance of $1000. Id. at § 909 (Supp. V 1975). The standard for computing these percen-
tages, the decedent's average weekly wage, was not disturbed by the amendments.
However, the maximum weekly amount receivable was changed from the arbitrary $70
ceiling to a floating ceiling based upon the "national average weekly wage." Id. This
figure is to be determined annually by the Secretary of Labor based upon wage sched-
ules throughout the country. 33 U.S.C. § 906(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975). The maximum
benefit to be permitted longshoremen is 200% of this fluctuating figure. Id. §
901(b)(1)(d) (Supp. V 1975). See generally Doak & Hecker, Is It a New Ball
Game?-The 1972Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, 11 FORUM 544 (1976); Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 1 (1974);
Note, Maritime Jurisdiction and Longshoremen's Remedies, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 649;
Note, Admiralty-Maritime Personal Injury and Death-Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, 47 TuL. L. REv. 1151 (1973); HousE
REPORT, supra note 11, at 2-4, 4700-01.
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those benefits under the Act. 0 The amendments have facilitated the
compensation of survivors of an employee who has become perma-
nently and totally disabled from a work-related injury, even if the
employee dies from causes wholly unrelated to his injury." Prior to
the amendments, survivors of a permanently and totally disabled
employee could recover death benefits only if he died as a result of
his work-related injuries.2 In Norfolk, B. & C. Lines, the Fourth
Circuit considered the constitutionality of the amended death bene-
fits provisions, and the admiralty jurisdictional propriety of extend-
ing benefits upon death "by other causes."
Plaintiffs in Norfolk, B. & C. Lines were the survivors of Lee
Rouse, a longshoreman injured in the course of his employment. In
1969, Rouse was declared permanently and totally disabled because
of the work-related injury. While still disabled, he died in 1974 from
non-injury-related causes. His survivors brought suit to collect death
benefits as provided by the LHWCA,93 and received favorable judg-
ments from the administrative law judge and the Benefits Review
Board. 4 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Review Board
decision.
5
The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that the
award of death benefits was an unconstitutional denial of due process
and an impairment of contract obligations. 6 Rouse's employer
pointed out that the 1972 LHWCA amendments had been applied
retrospectively, since Rouse had been injured and declared disabled
before enactment of the amendments. 7 However, the Fourth Circuit
determined that although retrospective statutes are not favored, such
" Prior to 1972, the LHWCA provided death benefits only in cases in which a
work-related injury caused the death. 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1970). However, the statute as
amended provides: "If the injury causes death, or if the employee who sustains perma-
nent total disability due to the injury thereafter dies from causes other than the injury,
the compensation shall be known as a death benefit." Id. § 909 (Supp. V 1975) (empha-
sis added).
91 Id.
,2 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1970), see note 90 supra.
539 F.2d at 379.
"1 2 BRBS 11 (1975), see note 22 supra.
539 F.2d at 381.
Id. at 380. The impairment of contracts argument was based on the contract
between the employer and his insurance carrier. A contract made prior to the amend-
ments would be based on a statutory scheme quite different from that created by the
amendment. The resulting changes dramatically increase the number of cases in which
the insurance company is obligated to pay as well as the amount to be paid in each
instance. See Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MARmTIME L. & COM. 1, 29 n.142 (1974).
'7 539 F.2d at 380.
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statutes are not per se unconstitutional. The court relied on
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation"9 in which the Supreme Court held that
"the mere fact that the legislation is retroactive does not necessarily
render it void."'' 0 Thus the bare claim of retroactivity in Norfolk, B.
& C. Lines was held to be lacking merit, and the court never consid-
ered whether the statute on its face is retrospective.' 1' The Fourth
Circuit also rejected Norfolk's claim that its contract obligations had
been impaired. The court explained that this constitutional proscrip-
9g Id.
9 174 U.S. 445 (1899). The statute at issue in Stephens provided a right to appeal
decisions from the United States Court for the Indian Territory to the Supreme Court.
Indian Territory Court decisions previously had been final. After the effective date of
the statute, claimants appealed Indian Territory Court decisions which had been
handed down prior to the statute's effective date, and which had been final under the
former law. The Supreme Court held that the legislation's retroactivity did not render
it void. Id. at 478. See also Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Chase
Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
' 174 U.S. at 478. See note 99 supra.
101 The retroactivity of the 1972 Amendments however, was considered by the
Second Circuit in American Stevedores, Inc. v. Salzano, 538 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1976).
One of the issues raised in that case was whether the provision in the amendments
providing for an increase in compensation due employees permanently and totally
disabled before 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 910(h) (Supp. V 1975), was unconstitutional as a
retrospective application of law. The Second Circuit determined that the constitution-
ality of retrospective provisions in workmen's compensation statutes is well estab-
lished. 538 F.2d at 937. Accordingly, the court found meritless the defendant's claim
that the 1972 LHWCA amendments are unconstitutional because of retrospective
applicability. 538 F.2d at 937.
The Fifth Circuit confronted the same issue in Landrum v. Air America, Inc., 534
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1976). The plaintiff, rather than the defendant, raised the retroactiv-
ity question in Landrum because the plaintiff's average weekly wage was substantially
above the national average weekly wage used as a maximum benefits standard in the
amendments. See note 89 supra. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the amendments
were intended to be retrospective and to apply to all pre-amendment injuries. 534 F.2d
at 70-71.
In Morris v. Joseph F. Nebel, Co., 4 BRBS 143 (1976), the Benefits Review Board
considered whether a death benefits award upon death by other causes was an invalid
application of § 909 without express congressional intent. Under factual circumstances
similar to those in Norfolk, the Board held that an award was a prospective rather than
retrospective application of the statute since the conferred benefit is a right which
accrued subsequent to the effective date of the amendments. 4 BRBS at 145. The
Board held that a claim for death benefits is a cause of action belonging to survivors
which arises at the disabled employee's death and is distinct from the injured em-
ployee's own prior claim for disability compensation. Id. Cf. National Independent
Coal Operator's Ass'n v. Brennan, 372 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 955
(1974) (retroactive operation of Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act held consti-
tutional).
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tion"'I applies only to states,103 and therefore is no bar to federal
action. 0 4 Similarly, the court held Norfolk's assertion that the
amendments impose responsibilities without due process was without
merit.0  The Supreme Court decision in Fleming v. Rhodes"'5 pro-
vided the Fourth Circuit with authority for this position. In Fleming,
the Supreme Court held that Congress could pass regulatory legisla-
tion which might encroach on contractual rights of parties arising
prior to the legislation. The Court stated that "[i]mmunity from
federal regulation is not gained through forehanded contracts.' '0 7 The
Fourth Circuit concluded on this basis that the LHWCA amend-
ments are not "an ordaining by Congress of a responsibility without
due process."'0 8
Finally,"' appellant in Norfolk, B. & C. Lines challenged the juris-
dictional propriety of a suit in admiralty based on claims for benefits
upon "death by other causes.""' 0 Appellant urged that Congress ex-
ceeded the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction' by extend-
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10[1] provides: "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
"1 539 F.2d at 381. The rule that the impairment of contract obligation clause
applies only to states is well settled. See Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & T. Co. v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 294 U.S. 648 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 294 U.S.
240 (1935); W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
10 In The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that Congress could not pass legislation which may have the
indirect effect of impairing contract obligations. The Court held that no obligation of
a contract can interfere with the exercise of legitimate governmental authority, and
that contracts must be understood to be subject to the possible exercise of such author-
ity. Id. at 549. See also Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago, R.I. &
P.R.R., 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
" 539 F.2d at 381.
,o 331 U.S. 100 (1947).
ID? Id. at 107. See also FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958).
I0 539 F.2d at 381.
'0 In addition to the constitutional arguments, Norfolk, B. & C. Lines asserted
that the LHWCA amendments contain so many inconsistencies and conflicting provi-
sions that application of the amendments is impracticable. Id. at 380. The court
responded that in spite of possible inconsistencies, the purpose of the amendments is
clear: "to enlarge the recompense provided to the survivors of a longshoreman dying
after suffering a permanent and total disability." Id. The court relied on Lawson v.
Suwanee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198 (1949). In that case, the Supreme Court
interpreted the unamended LHWCA and stated that statutory definitions of words
should not be applied where incongruity results and the major purpose of the statute
is thwarted. Id. at 201.
110 33 U.S.C. § 909 (Supp. V 1975); see note 90 supra.
" Article Three of the Constitution contains the general grant of admiralty juris-
diction to the federal courts: "The Judicial Power Shall Extend . . . to all Cases of
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
ing LHWCA death benefits to deaths unrelated to maritime employ-
ment."2 The Fourth Circuit, however, decided that the Act's basic
purpose of providing compensation to injured longshoremen and their
families is maritime in nature,"3 and that the amended benefits pro-
vision at issue was designed to promote the LHWCA's purpose."' The
court suggested that the permanent and total disablement of an em-
ployee while engaged in longshoring activities was a sufficiently
strong maritime nexus to remain effective until his death." 5 In addi-
tion, the court pointed out that the Act's purpose to aid the families
of injured longshoremen is furthered by the procedural assistance
afforded by the amendments.' Since LHWCA benefits are now
available to survivors of permanently and totally disabled longshore-
Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2[1]. Article Three has
been held to confer three grants of maritime adjudicative power. Congress is empow-
ered to give lower federal courts maritime jurisdiction; federal courts impliedly are
empowered to apply substantive law inherent in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;
and Congress impliedly is empowered to supplement or revise substantive maritime
law. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360 (1959).
Appellant in Norfolk, B. & C. Lines apparently argued that the words "admiralty"
and "maritime" as used in the Constitution were not intended to encompass occurr-
ences unrelated to navigable waters or maritime activity. Specifically, appellant con-
tended that through broadening admiralty jurisdiction to include actions for death
benefits where the death was unrelated to maritime activity, Congress has given fed-
eral courts jurisdiction without any constitutional basis. Rouse v. Norfolk, B. & C.
Lines, 2 BRBS 11, 16 (1975). See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971);
Cf. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (powers reserved to the States under the
Constitution to adjudicate controversies in their courts may be restricted only by
congressional action in conformity with the judiciary sections of the Constitution). See
generally G. GILoMR & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-9 (2d ed. 1975); 7A
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § .200[2] (2d ed. 1976).
"2 Admiralty tort jurisdiction now depends on establishing a significant relation-
ship between a tort and a traditional maritime activity. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc.
v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). The tort must have occurred over
navigable waters and must be significantly related to traditional maritime navigation
and commerce. Id. See also Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121
(5th Cir. 1972); Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Guer-
rant, 290 F. Supp. 111 (S.D. Tex. 1968); McGuire v. New York, 192 F. Supp. 866
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). See generally Birdwell & Whitten, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Out-
look for the Doctrine of Executive Jet, 1974 DUKE L.J. 757; Note, Pleasure Boat Torts
in Admiralty Jurisdiction: Satisfying the Maritime Nexus Standard, 34 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 121 (1977); Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Executive Jet in Historical
Perspective, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1973).
"I The Fourth Circuit indicated that the purpose of § 909 is "to assure indemnifi-
cation of survivors of the inshore maritime worker who had become utterly disabled
in his work for the rest of his life." 539 F.2d at 380.
MI Id.
"' Id.; see note 112 supra.
", Id. at 381.
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men who die from non-injury-related causes, survivors no longer must
prove that the disabling injury was the proximate cause of death."'
No other circuit has considered the jurisdictional issue of whether
a claim for benefits upon death by other causes is appropriate to
admiralty courts. However, the Benefits Review Board has consid-
ered this question several times"5 and consistently has held that a
sufficient maritime nexus exists to assure the constitutionality of the
provision. In Norfolk, B. & B. Lines,"' the Review Board upheld the
validity of the death benefits provisions on the basis of the Supreme
Court decision in Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum. 120 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that Congress may constitutionally
create new causes of action in admiralty provided a "maritime" rela-
tionship exists, as "maritime" is defined by current usage.'2' Apply-
ing this reasoning to Norfolk, B. & C. Lines, the Review Board found
that Congress had not exceeded its power in providing death benefits
to survivors of a former maritime employee. 2
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Norfolk, B. & C. Lines provides
an important step toward establishing the constitutionality of the
1972 LHWCA amendments. The Fourth Circuit not only held that
the amendments' retrospective nature does not render them void,'3
but also upheld the "death by other causes" provision. In so doing,
the court held that the provision was sufficiently maritime-related to
fall within the general constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction.
This decision provides the Review Board with judicial precedent for
the constitutionality of the "death by other causes" provision, which
promotes the liberal remedy intended by Congress."4
I Id. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 909 (Supp. V 1975), with 5 U.S.C. § 8102 (1970) (the
compensation statute covering government employees, which allows recovery of death
benefits only upon a showing that death was caused by an injury sustained in the
course of employment.)
"' Witthuhn v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 3 BRBS 146 (1976); Morris v. Joseph F.
Nebel Co., 4 BRBS 143 (1976); Pesce v. Guardino & Sons, 4 BRBS 36 (1976).
H 2 BRBS 11 (1975).
' 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
1 The Thomas Barlum involved the constitutionality of the Ship Mortgage Act,
46 U.S.C. § 953 (1970). The Court held that the framers of the Constitution did not
intend that the concept of maritime law would remain unalterable. Rather, Congress
has the power to alter the extent of maritime law as changing conditions require. 293
U.S. at 42. See also Panama Ry. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
" 2 BRBS 11, 16 (1975).
In holding that the amendment's retrospective nature did not render it void,
the Fourth Circuit concurred with the Second and Fifth Circuits. See note 101 supra.
24 See generally HousE REPORT, supra note 11.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
B. Bridgeworkers as "Seamen" under the Jones Act.
The Jones Act' is designed to provide compensation for seamen
who are injured in the course of their employment.' Since the Act's
coverage extends only to seamen,3 much litigation has focused upon
the definition of "seaman" as used in the Act.4 In determining who
is a seaman, courts have looked to traditional considerations of a
claimant's status as a member of a vessel's crew,' the nature of his
duties, and his relationship to the vessel and its navigation.' The Act
clearly applies to conventional shipboard seamen, but courts have
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The sections of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 still in
force are found at 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-89, except for the most famous section of the Act,
§ 688. Actually the entire Merchant Marine Act is named the Jones Act for Senator
Wesley L. Jones of Washington.
2 Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936);
Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934).
The statute provides: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may. . . maintain an action for damages." 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
See generally Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952); Mietla v. Warner
Co., 387 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMniALTY §§ 6-20 to 6-21 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
E.g., United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); Senko v. LaCrosse
Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957); Lewis v. Roland E. Trego & Sons, 501 F.2d 372
(4th Cir. 1974); Noack v. American S.S. Co., 491 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1974); Garcia v.
The Queen, Ltd., 487 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1973); Harney v. William M. Moore Bldg.
Corp., 359 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1966).
5 The traditional "seaman" requirements of crew member status and a relation-
ship to navigation were expressed by the Supreme Court in Swanson v. Marra Bros.,
328 U.S. 1, 4 (1946). The terms "seaman" and "member of the crew" have become
synonymous because of the use of one term in the Jones Act and the other in the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (Supp.
V 1975), to describe the same type of employee. See Brown v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 497
F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1974); Mietla v. Warner Co., 387 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Courts have held that the vessel should be in navigation, that the employee
should be aboard primarily to aid in navigation, and that a somewhat permanent
connection should exist between the employee and the vessel. Noack v. American S.S.
Co., 491 F.2d 937, 938-39 (6th Cir. 1974); Garcia v. The Queen, Ltd., 487 F.2d 625,
628 n.6 (5th Cir. 1973); Nelson v. Green Line Steamers, Inc., 255 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 867 (1959); Bellomy v. Union Concrete Pipe Co., 297 F.
Supp. 261, 264 (S.D. W.Va. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 420 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 904 (1970); Hill v. Diamond, 203 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 311
F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1962).
The term "navigation" has been construed broadly, both with regard to a vessel
in navigation, Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957); Rogers v. United
States, 452 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1971); and as to the employee's duties, Lewis v. Roland
E. Trego and Sons, 501 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974); Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand &
Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1953); Early v. American Dredging Co., 101 F. Supp.
393 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
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encountered difficulty when applying the Act to barge workers or
construction workers who occasionally work on board barges.7
In Whittington v. Sewer Construction Co.,8 a bridgeworker injured
while engaged in bridge demolition, brought suit under the Jones Act
to recover compensation for his injuries.' The Fourth Circuit held
that the bridgeworker did not possess seaman status, finding that
Whittington had no permanent connection to a vessel and did not aid
in navigation of a vessel." The court also determined that the tort
causing his injury occurred upon a bridge, and that bridges, as exten-
sions of land, are not within admiralty jurisdiction."
Whittington was a laborer on a bridge demolition crew when in-
jured in the course of his employment. 2 Seeking recovery in admi-
ralty, Whittington relied primarily on the peculiar facts surrounding
his injury to support the existence of admiralty jurisdiction. 3 The
injury occurred when Whittington was being lowered by a winch on
the bridge to a barge which served as a receptacle for dismantled
scrap. As plaintiff began his descent to the barge, the cable on which
he was riding caught on a projecting beam in the bridge, causing him
to fall to the barge below.' On the day prior to his injury, Whittington
briefly had worked on this barge detaching materials lowered from
the cable hook. Whittington argued, on the basis of this relationship
to the barge, that he was an "able-bodied seaman," and thus entitled
to recover in admiralty.
5
The Fourth Circuit initially examined three possible grounds for
7 E.g., Cox v. Otis Engineering Corp., 474 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1973); Burns v.
Anchor-Wate Co., 469 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1972); Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transp.
Corp., 375 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Hartzfelds v. Travelers Ins. Co., 369 F. Supp.
955 (W.D. La. 1974).
541 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1976).
In addition to Jones Act compensation, Whittington sought "maintenance and
cure" under general admiralty law. 541 F.2d at 430. "Maintenance and cure" is the
seaman's ancient right to be supported and cared for by his ship when injured in her
service, irrespective of fault, GILMoRE & BLACK, supra note 3, at § 1-10; see also The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). A suit brought for maintenance and cure requires the
same showing of seaman status as in a suit under the Jones Act. Swanson v. Marra
Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946).
" 541 F.2d at 436.
" Id. at 433. See text accompanying note 21 infra.
12 541 F.2d at 431.
13 Id. at 429.
11 Id. at 431.
"1 Id. at 430. Plaintiff's deposition, which was the only evidence before the district
court when it dismissed the case, indicated that plaintiff had worked on the barge for
as much as "half of a day." Plaintiff claimed to be an "able bodied seaman" employed
to perform the work of a deckhand. Id. at 430-31.
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the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over torts:" general admiralty
law, the Admiralty Extension Act,'7 and the Jones Act.'8 Under gen-
eral admiralty law, tort claims can be brought only if the injury
occurred upon navigable waters and was significantly related to tra-
ditional maritime activity." The Fourth Circuit held that Whitting-
ton's claim could not be brought on this theory since the winch which
had caused the injury was located on the bridge.20 Bridges tradition-
ally are considered extensions of land2' and not as vessels or objects
upon navigable waters. As a-result, the winch must be considered a
shore-based instrument which caused a tort on the land extension,"
and thus, does not satisfy the jurisdictional locality criterion neces-
sary to bring a tort claim within general admiralty law."
The second jurisdictional possibility, the Admiralty Extension
Act, 4 requires that the injury be caused by a vessel or an appurte-
nance of a vessel in navigable waters. Again, the court rejected the
statute's applicability because the locus of the accident was the
" The court did not consider the admiralty tort causes of action clearly inapplica-
ble to Whittington such as the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1970), the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970), and the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-50 (Supp. V 1975).
'7 46 U.S.C. § 640 (1970).
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
" Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
21 541 F.2d at 432.
22 Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969); Evans v. Louisiana
Dep't of Hwys., 430 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1970). Cf. Kozikowski v. Delaware River Port
Auth., 397 F. Supp. 1115 (D.N.J. 1975), and Oregon Transfer Co. v. Tyee Constr. Co,
188 F. Supp. 647 (D. Ore. 1960) (a bridge is part of the highway to which it is con-
nected).
2 The locus of the accident centers at the point where the tort occurs, not where
it is consummated. See, for example, May v. Lease Serv., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D.
La.), a/f'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1973), where the plaintiff was injured
when he fell from a fixed platform in the Gulf of Mexico onto the deck of ship. Plaintiff
was working a winch affixed to the platform to off-load some equipment from the ship
when the accident occurred. The court held that the locus of the accident for determin-
ing jurisdiction was where the fall started, not where it eventually stopped. 365 F.
Supp. at 1204.
n 541 F.2d at 433. Since the plaintiff did not establish the locality requirement,
the Fourth Circuit did not have to consider whether the employment and injury of a
bridgeworker is sufficiently related to traditional maritime activities as to fall within
admiralty jurisdiction.
24 The Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970), provides a remedy to
those injured on shore by an appurtenance of a vessel. However, a maritime nexus is
still required or recovery is barred. See Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973);
Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Peytavin v. Government Em-
ployees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972).
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shore-based winch" rather than the barge. Thus, the injury was
wholly unrelated to a vessel on navigable waters."6
Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered the jurisdictional require-
ments of the Jones Act. A claimant under the Jones Act must be a
seaman injured in the course of his employment.2 7 Recovery under
that Act, however, does not require that the injury occur over naviga-
ble waters.3 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that Whittington
failed to satisfy the Jones Act test because he could not reasonably
be categorized as a seaman. 2 The court relied on the Supreme Court
holding in Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp.2 0 that a "seaman" must
be a crew member in the permanent employ of a vessel.3' Moreover,
the Supreme Court has held that a claimant must be on board the
vessel primarily to aid in navigation.2 The Fourth Circuit found
that Whittington had not satisfied either of these essential require-
ments; that he was neither in the permanent employ of the vessel nor
on board primarily to aid in navigation.23 Furthermore, the court held
that the bare allegation that he was injured while performing a task
5 See note 22 supra, note 26 infra.
541 F.2d at 433. A shore-based winch is considered an extension of land and not
a part of the vessel it services. McCullum v. United Int'l Corp., 493 F.2d 501 (9th Cir.
1974); Snydor v. Villain & Fassio et Cia. Int'l Di Genova Societa Reunite Di Navia-
gaione, S.P.A., 459 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1972).
7 See text accompanying notes 2 & 3 supra.
The Supreme Court in Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 373
(1957), stated: "The fact that petitioner's injury occurred on land is not material.
Admiralty jurisdiction and the coverage of the Jones Act depends only on a finding
that the injured was 'an employee of the vessel, engaged in the course of his employ-
ment' at the time of his injury," quoting Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 4 (1946).
See also O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943); Garrett v.
Gutzeit O/Y, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974); Delancey v. Motichek Towing Serv., Inc.,
427 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1970).
" 541 F.2d at 433.
- 352 U.S. 370 (1957).
31 Id. at 372. In Senko, the plaintiff was a handyman on a dredge. His duties
involved transporting and storing supplies, and general maintenance of the dredge,
which was anchored to shore for the entire duration of his employment. A coal stove
explosion in a shed on land caused his injuries. The Supreme Court found him to be a
member of the crew not only because most of his work was done on the dredge, but
also because plaintiff would have had to perform navigational duties had the dredge
been moved. Id. at 374.
312 South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Basett, 309 U.S. 251, 260 (1940). The plaintiff
in Bassett was suing under the LHWCA, which excludes seamen from its coverage.
Thus, in holding that the plaintiff, had no navigational duties, and therefore was not
a seaman, the court facilitated his recovery of compensation. See also note 6 supra.
1 541 F.2d at 434.
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traditionally done by seamen was not a basis for invoking admiralty
jurisdiction."
Judge Widener dissented, asserting that Whittington's status as
a seaman is a question of fact which goes to the merits as well as to
jurisdiction; and that the claim should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction solely on the basis of plaintiff's deposition. Judge Wide-
ner contended that Whittington's allegations that he was performing
work on a vessel were sufficient to invoke admiralty jurisdiction and
to warrant further factual inquiry.5 The dissent relied primarily upon
two Supreme Court cases, Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co.31
and Butler v. Whiteman,3" which were factually similar to
Whittington. Grimes was a pile driver employed in the construction
of an off-shore radar platform.38 His claim to seaman status rested
upon six hours of work on a barge on the day of his injury. The injury
occurred as he was being transferred from a tug to the platform. The
First Circuit in Grimes affirmed"9 the lower court's directed verdict
for the defendant, and Grimes appealed. The Supreme Court held
3' Id. The court relied on Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), in
which the Supreme Court held that admiralty jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely
because a worker is injured while performing a task traditionally done by seamen. Law
was a longshoreman injured while engaged in such a task, and sought to recover under
the unseaworthiness doctrine without a further basis for admiralty jurisdiction. The
Court determined that absent a basis for establishing admiralty jurisdiction, the un-
seaworthiness doctrine is unavailable and the injured worker's involvement in typical
seaman's work is immaterial. Id. at 210-11. The unseaworthiness doctrine does not
provide a basis for jurisdiction, but merely a remedy for those who have already
fulfilled the navigable waters and maritime nexus test, or come within the Admiralty
Extension Act. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); United Pilots
Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1958); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85
(1946); see note 24 supra, text accompanying note 19 supra.
The Fourth Circuit apparently was misled by appellant's brief in regard to the
unseaworthiness claim. The court refers to the brief where unseaworthiness is men-
tioned, 541 F.2d at 430, and proceeds to devote a portion of the opinion to a discussion
of why Whittington is not eligible to avail himself of this doctrine. Id. at 433-34.
However, Judge Widener pointed out in dissent that the complaint only sought recov-
ery under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and under general admiralty law for mainte-
nance and cure. 541 F.2d at 437-38 (Widener, J., dissenting). Whittington did not
allege unseaworthiness in the complaint and the issue was not before the court.
3' 541 F.2d at 437 (Widener, J., dissenting).
356 U.S. 252 (1958), rev'g, 245 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1957).
3' 356 U.S. 271 (1958); cited in the dissent of Judge Widener as Butler v. Bridge-
man [sic], 541 F.2d at 440.
1 243 F.2d at 564. Fixed off-shore platforms such as the one in Grimes, like
bridges, are treated as extensions of land. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395
U.S. 352 (1969); Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv. Inc.,
377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.),cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967).
3' 245 F.2d 437, 440 (1st Cir. 1957).
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that these facts provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to require jury
determination of the seaman status question."0
Similarly in Butler, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's dismissal of a Jones Act claim. 41 Butler, a harbor worker who
performed odd jobs about the wharf, drowned in the course of his
employment. His survivors sought Jones Act compensation, claiming
that Butler was a seaman on the basis of his relationship to a tug
whose boilers he had been cleaning. This tug, withdrawn from service
for over a year, was inoperable and had neither captain nor crew.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the claim,
citing Grimes and Senko for support in requiring jury determination
of the seaman question.
2
The implicit rule of Grimes and Butler is that any worker whose
duties require the slightest contact with a vessel on navigable waters
is entitled to a jury determination of his seaman status, and that a
determination in his favor cannot be set aside. 3 The Whittington
decision clearly conflicts with this rule. Nevertheless, the contrary
holding in Whittington finds support in several recent Fourth and
Fifth Circuit decisions. In Dugas v. Pelican Construction Co.,4" the
Fifth Circuit reversed a district court finding that a worker assigned
to a barge for one day was a seaman. Likewise in Cox v. Otis Engi-
neering Corp.," the Fifth Circuit dismissed a Jones Act claim, hold-
ing that a worker whose duties required him to be on a barge for two
days was not a seaman."
The Fourth Circuit previously considered whether a construction
worker could qualify as a seaman in Lewis v. Roland E. Trego &
4' 356 U.S. at 253.
243 F.2d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 1956).
42 356 U.S. at 271.
, See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-21 at 333.
+ 481 F.d 772 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1094 (1973). Claimant, a rousta-
bout employed for one day on a drilling barge, was injured when knocked down by a
drilling pipe. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court determination that claimant
was a seaman, and the appellate court held that he did not have a sufficiently perma-
nent connection to the barge. Id. at 777-78.
I 474 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1973). Cox was working as a wireline operator aboard a
drilling barge when injured. He was supposed to be aboard the barge for two days, but
was injured during the first day. The district court dismissed the Jones Act claim and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Cox's relation to the barge was not sufficiently
permanent to support his claim to seaman status. 474 F.2d at 613.
48 See also Labit v. Carey Salt Co., 421 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1970), where claimant
was a loader who worked on a conveyor pier. The extent of his contact with a vessel
was that "he occasionally moved a barge a few feet to position it for loading. This falls
woefully short of permanent assignment to a vessel or the performance of a substantial
part of his work on the vessel." Id. at 1335.
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Sons.47 The plaintiff in Lewis was a marine construction laborer in-
jured aboard a barge while engaged in building a boathouse. The
Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly dismissed the
claim on the basis of evidence that Lewis had no seaman's papers,
was not assigned to a particular vessel, rarely accompanied the barge
when it was moved, slept ashore, and performed 90% of his work on
land. 8 If these criteria are applied to the Whittington facts, the dis-
trict court appropriately dismissed the claim.49
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits are not applying the principle es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Grimes, which requires a jury
determination of the seaman question where a claimant has the
slightest contact with a vessel on navigable waters." While this de-
parture from Grimes seems limited largely to the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits,5 the deviation within each of these circuits is far from abso-
lute."2 The two most recent cases in the Fourth Circuit, Lewis and
Whittington, may indicate a trend in the circuit away from unques-
tioning application of Grimes. However, until the Fourth Circuit is-
sues a clear statement of the law, "the plaintiff's fate, in cases of this
sort, seems to depend on the luck of the judicial draw." 3
47 501 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974).
49 Id. at 373.
" See 541 F.2d at 431.
See text accompanying note 43 supra.
5' See Harney v. William M. Moore Bldg. Corp., 359 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1966)
(claimant held to be seaman); Stafford v. Perini Corp., 475 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1973)
(seaman question held to be matter for jury determination). But see Powers v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1973).
52 See Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 360 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1966), where a plaintiff
was employed in constructing the Chesapeake Bay Bridge Tunnel and injured when
debarking from the company boat which had ferried him out to the work site. The
Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Jones Act claim, and remanded to have
the lower court determine if claimant was a seaman. Id. at 364-65.
In Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d-1157 (5th Cir. 1972), the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict allowing plaintiff to recover as a seaman. The
plaintiff was employed by a dredging outfit but a substantial part of his work was on
land. The Fifth Circuit stated that since Senko and Grimes
it has been clear that it is a rare case indeed in which a court may
conclude as a matter of law that an injured individual is not a seaman
within the meaning of the Jones Act. . . .[E]ven where the underly-
ing facts are largely undisputed, the determination of whether an
individual is a seaman will ordinarily be left to the jury.
Id. at 1162.
0 GiumoRE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-12 at 334.
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C. The Wreck Removal Acts and the Coast Guard's Duty To
Mark.
The Wreck Removal Acts' provide that the responsibility for re-
moving and marking wrecks or obstructions in navigable waters is
divided between the Army Corps of Engineers and the Coast Guard.'
Prior to 1965, the Coast Guard was assigned a discretionary duty to
mark wrecks in cases where the owners had failed to mark them
suitably.3 This duty remained in effect only until abandonment of the
wreck had been established.' Upon abandonment, the duty shifted to
the Corps of Engineers either to maintain suitable marking or to
remove the wreck.5 The Secretary of the Army could choose to mark
14 U.S.C. § 86 (Supp. V 1975); 33 U.S.C. §§ 409, 414 (1970). See generally
Annot., 19 A.L.R. FED. 297 (1974). Subsequent to the 1965 amendments, 14 U.S.C. §
86 was again amended. In 1974 the words "any navigable waters" were replaced by
"the navigable waters or waters above the continental shelf." The additional language
is immaterial to this case however, which focuses on the 1965 amendments.
2 14 U.S.C. § 86 (1970) provides that the Coast Guard through the Secretary of
Transportation may mark sunken vessels in navigable waters as long as the needs of
maritime navigation require. 33 U.S.C. § 414 (1970) provides that the Secretary of the
Army may remove abandoned wrecks which endanger navigation in navigable waters.
3 The pre-amendment statute provided in pertinent part: "The Coast Guard may
mark for the protection of navigation any sunken vessel or other similar obstruction
existing on any navigable waters of the United States, whenever the owner thereof has,
in the judgment of the Coast Guard, failed suitably to mark the same." 14 U.S.C. §
86 (1956) (amended 1965).
The standard for "suitable marking" by the owner is established in 33 U.S.C. §
409 (1970), which provides that when a craft is sunkin a navigable channel, the owner
must mark the wreck immediately with a buoy or beacon by day, and a lighted lantern
at night. See generally Schroeder, The Wreck Act: Owner's Duty to Mark-Moving
Toward Strict Liability, 42 INs. COUNSEL J. 561 (1975).
Abandonment can be established by sending notice of intention to abandon to
the Army Corps of Engineers, 33 C.F.R. § 64.15-1 (1976). Also, abandonment can be
established by failing to commence immediate removal of the wreck and to prosecute
such removal diligently. 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970). If the wreck has not been removed
within 30 days, abandonment is presumed. Jones Towing, Inc. v. United States, 277
F. Supp. 839, 848 (E.D. La. 1967); Wheeldon v. United States, 184 F. Supp. 81, 83
(N.D. Cal. 1960); People's Coal Co. v. Second Pool Coal Co., 181 F. 609, 612 (W.D.
Pa. 1910), aff'd, 188 F. 892 (3d Cir. 1911); see Thames Towboat Co. v. Fields, 287 F.
155, 156, (S.D.N.Y. 1922). But see The Snug Harbor, 40 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1930).
' The pertinent provisions of the two statutes establishing the Army's duty were:
"As soon as the abandonment of any such obstruction has been so established, the
Secretary of the Army shall keep the same so marked [as previously done by the Coast
Guard] pending removal thereof. . . ." 14 U.S.C. § 86 (1956) (amended 1965).
Whenever the .. .navigable waters of the United States shall be
obstructed or endangered by any sunken vessel . . ., and such ob-
struction has existed for a longer period than thirty days, or whenever
the abandonment of such obstruction can be legally established in a
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or remove the vessel, but these were the exclusive alternatives.6 Thus,
a mandatory duty was imposed upon him to perform one operation
or the other.
7
In 1965, Congress amended the Wreck Acts to extend the Coast
Guard's responsibility for marking obstructions until the time of the
wreck's removal, regardless of when abandonment is established.,
The Army accordingly was relieved of the duty to mark abandoned
wrecks, and now bears only the responsibility for removing wrecks.9
The purpose of the amendment was to delineate the respective res-
ponsibilities of the Coast Guard and Army, and to eliminate the
confusion caused by assigning a duty to mark wrecks to both govern-
ment agencies." This shift in responsibilities, however, was not ac-
companied by a clear indication of whether the Coast Guard's new
less space of time, the sunken vessel ... shall be subject to be...
removed ... by the Secretary of the-Army at his discretion ....
33 U.S.C. § 414 (1970).
Buffalo Bayou Transp. Co. v. United States, 375 F.2d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1967);
Jones Towing, Inc. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 839, 848 (E.D. La. 1967).
1 The Fourth Circuit stated in an earlier case: "As we read the Wreck Acts, the
duty of the United States to mark or remove the wreck is mandatory." Somerset
Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951). Accord, Jones Towing,
Inc. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 839, 848 (E.D. La. 1967); Wheeldon v. United
States, 184 F. Supp. 81, 84 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States,
138 F. Supp. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), modified, 247 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1957).
1 Act of Sept. 17, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-191, 79 Stat. 822 (codified at 14 U.S.C. §
86 (Supp. V 1975)).
'The amended statute provides in pertinent part: "The Secretary may mark for
the protection of navigation any sunken vessel ... on the navigable waters ... of
the United States in such manner and for so long as, in his judgment, the needs of
maritime navigation require." 14 U.S.C. § 86 (Supp. V 1975). The shift in delegation
of duty was accomplished by deleting the language which assigned the post-
abandonment duty to the Army Corps of Engineers. See notes 3 & 5 supra.
" The Senate Report explained the purpose of the bill:
The purpose of H.R. 725 is to clarify the responsibility, as among
Government agencies, for marking obstructions in navigable waters.
... This bill as recommended by the Secretary of the Treasury,
provides that the primary obligation for marking all obstructions to
navigation rests with the Coast Guard. This should completely elimi-
nate the present lack of clarity.
Specifically, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to mark
wrecks and other obstructions which, in his judgment, constitute ob-
structions to navigation.
S. REP. No. 688, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965); reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3140.
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duty to mark wrecks after abandonment is discretionary or manda-
tory."
The Fourth Circuit considered the nature of the Coast Guard's
duty in Lane v. United States.'" The plaintiff in Lane was towing a
waterskier behind his cabin cruiser when he ran upon an unmarked
sunken barge. The resulting damage to the cabin cruiser caused it to
sink minutes later.' 3 Lane brought suit under the Suits in Admiralty
Act'" to recover against the United States for its negligent failure to
mark the wreck.'5 The district court held the United States liable for
breach of its mandatory duty to mark or remove abandoned wrecks,
and found no contributory negligence on the part of Lane.'" On ap-
peal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the United States has a
mandatory or discretionary duty to mark abandoned wrecks, and
whether Lane was contributorily negligent through his failure to con-
sult charts on which the wreck was marked.'7 The court affirmed the
district court's finding that Lane was not contributorily negligent,
but reversed on the liability issue, holding that the amendments
imposed only a discretionary duty on the Coast Guard to mark wrecks
after abandonment.' 8
The Fourth Circuit compared the language of the Wreck Acts
before and after the 1965 amendments. The court observed that the
" See note 10 supra. The congressional report did not directly address the question
of the type of authority vested in the Coast Guard. However, when the Secretary of
the Treasury submitted the bill to the Senate, an enclosed communique addressed to
the President of the Senate included the following description of the bill: "The bill
would vest sole responsibility for wreck marking in the Coast Guard. It would give the
Secretary of the Treasury discretionary authority to mark wrecks or other similar
obstructions for so long as in his judgment the needs of maritime navigation may
require." S. REP. No. 688, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1965); reprinted in [1965] U.S.
Co E CONG. & AD. NEws 3140, 3141. (emphasis added).
12 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975).
,1 Lane was towing a skier in the Intracoastal Waterway when he ran his boat upon
a submerged wreck. The wreck had been in the waterway about five years, during
which time eight to ten boats had run upon it. After the last collision was reported,
both government agencies denied responsibility for failing to mark the wreck, and each
placed the blame upon the other. 529 F.2d at 177.
" 46 U.S.C. § 741 et seq. (1970).
The Suits in Admiralty Act provides that admiralty suits may be maintained
against the United States if such action could have been maintained against a private
person. Id. at § 742. In effect, the Act is a qualified waiver of sovereign immunity.
Roberts v. United States. 498 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974); De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 145 (5th Cir. 1971).
,6 529 F.2d at 176, 180.
,7 Id. at 177-78, 180; Brief for Appellant at 2, 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975).
529 F.2d at 180.
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statutes prior to amendment were interpreted to give the Coast
Guard a discretionary duty to mark sunken vessels until their aban-
donment, while the Corps of Engineers had a mandatory duty to
mark or remove after abandonment. 9 The 1965 amendments altered
14 U.S.C. § 86 by deleting the language which imposed the manda-
tory duty on the Army to mark abandoned wrecks."0 Thus, the court
determined that the nature of the Coast Guard's responsibility re-
mained unchanged by the amendments, while the extent of its re-
sponsibility was increased. 21 The discretionary duty of the Coast
Guard now extends to marking wrecks after abandonment has been
established.?
The Fourth Circuit suggested that Congress probably did not in-
tend to change the mandatory nature of the statute with respect to
marking abandoned wrecks. However, the court determined that the
amended language has established a discretionary duty to mark after
abandonment?2 Nevertheless, the court stated that the Coast Guard
must exercise its responsibility in a reasonable manner without ignor-
ing real dangers to navigation.2 ' Therefore, the case was remanded to
the district court to determine whether the failure to mark the wreck
was an abuse of the discretionary authority vested in the Coast
Guard.?
11 Id. at 178; see note 7 supra.
21 529 F.2d at 178. The remainder of § 86 was not altered substantially, the great-
est change being the substitution of the word "Secretary" for "Coast Guard." Compare
note 3 with note 9 supra. The Coast Guard has since been moved from the Department
of Treasury to the Department of Transportation; thus, the Secretary referred to is now
the Secretary of Transportation. Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 6(b), 80
Stat. 931 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1655(b) (1970)).
1 529 F.2d at 178.
22 Id.; see note 4 supra.
23 529 F.2d at 178; see note 10 supra.
21 The Lane case is the first time a court has interpreted the Coast Guard's ex-
tended discretionary duty under § 86. However, an analogous discretionary duty of the
Coast Guard which has been interpreted by courts exists under 14 U.S.C. § 81 (1970).
Section 81 provides that the Coast Guard may establish, maintain, and operate aids
to air or maritime navigation "[in order to aid navigation and to prevent disasters,
collisions, and wrecks of vessels and aircraft. Id. In interpreting the discretionary duty
imposed by § 81, courts have never addressed the question of what limitations are
placed upon the exercise of discretion. Rather, the courts have held that once the
discretion is exercised in favor of putting out navigational aids such as buoys and
markers, due care must be exercised to maintain the aid properly. Indian Towing Co.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955); Afran Transp. Co. v. United States, 309 F.
Supp. 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 872 (1971); Pioneer S.S. Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 140, 148 (E.D. Wis.
1959); but see Kline v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 298, 301 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
22 529 F.2d at 180.
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The United States contended that Lane was contributorily negli-
gent for failing to consult a navigation chart. Evidence indicated
that the wreck was marked on a current chart of the waters in ques-
tion.2" The court rejected the United States' argument that Lane's
proper consultation of a chart could have prevented the accident on
the basis of its decision in United States v. Travis. 8 The Fourth
Circuit there held that experienced small boat navigators who are
familiar with the waters are not bound to notice published informa-
tion. 9 Upon evidence that Lane was familiar with the waters, the
district court had found that he was not contributorily negligent, and
the Fourth Circuit declined to hold this finding clearly erroneous as
a matter of law.2
The United States did not challenge the propriety of allowing
Lane's claim to be brought in admiralty. However, current confusion
over the sufficiency of a maritime nexus in pleasure boat tort cases,3
prompted the Fourth Circuit to justify admiralty jurisdiction in this
instance.2 The court relied on Richards v. Blake Builders Supply,
Inc.31 to support the proposition that pleasure craft are included
21 Id.
" The accuracy of the symbol's location purporting to signify the wreck was dis-
puted in the trial. Id. at 180 n.9.
- 165 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1947).
21 Id. at 548.
10 529 F.2d at 180.
3' See generally Note, Pleasure Boat Torts in Admiralty Jurisdiction: Satisfying
the Maritime Nexus Standard, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 121 (1977); Comment,
Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Pleasure Craft Torts, 36 MD. L. REv. 212 (1976); Com-
ment, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Pleasure Craft and Maritime Nexus, 12 CAL. W. L. REv.
535 (1976). The Supreme Court decision in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), restricted the scope of admiralty jurisdiction over torts
having no maritime connection. Previously, a strict locality test had been used to
determine the existence of admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions. See 7A MooRE's
FEDEAL PRAcTm 325 (2d ed. 1976). The issue was raised in Executive Jet because
that case involved tort actions arising from an airplane crash in navigable waters. In
holding that admiralty jurisdiction did not attach to the case because traditional
maritime activity was not involved, the Court cited cases involving swimmers and
waterskiers as examples of situations with a maritime locality, but without a maritime
nexus. 409 U.S. at 255, 256 n.5. Although Executive Jet specifically concerned an
aviation tort, that decision and the maritime nexus test has been applied to maritime
torts generally. See, e.g., Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758 (4th
Cir. 1973); Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1974).
2 529 F.2d at 180.
3 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975); for an analysis of this case and the questions which
it raises, see Note, Pleasure Boat Torts in Admiralty Jurisdiction: Satisfying the Mari-
time Nexus Standard, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 121 (1977).
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within admiralty jurisdiction. Richards combined two cases for ap-
peal. In one, a passenger sued the pleasure boat operator for injuries
received when the boat blew up; in the second case, the claimant sued
the pleasure boat operator for injuries received when the boat swerved
into a river bank at high speed." The court held that plaintiffs in
pleasure boat cases may invoke admiralty jurisdiction since a suffi-
cient relationship exists with traditional maritime activities.
The Fourth Circuit then distinguished Lane from its earlier deci-
sion in Crosson v. Vance.38 In Crosson, the court denied admiralty
jurisdiction to a claim brought by a waterskier for lack of some rela-
tionship of waterskiing to traditional maritime activity. 7 In Lane
however, the waterskier's presence was only incidental to the sub-
stantive claim involved. The court noted that collisions between ves-
sels in navigation and submerged hulks traditionally have been 'a
concern of admiralty.3s The court inferred that pleasure boat claims
based on the Wreck Acts are within admiralty, while claims by water-
skiers would not satisfy the jurisdictional maritime nexus test."9
Thus, the court limited its holding to pleasure boaters whose causes
of action arise out of traditional maritime concerns.
The Fourth Circuit is the first court of appeals to hold that the
United States no longer has a mandatory duty to mark abandoned
wrecks. The holding effectively eliminates United States liability for
failure to mark unless an abuse of discretion can be shown."0 Some
legislators may, as the Lane court indicated, be surprised to find that
they relieved the government of its mandatory duty to mark wrecks.41
Nevertheless, the propriety of the decision is not likely to be ques-
tioned since the Fourth Circuit relied on the exact language of the
statute to reach its result.
42
3' 528 F.2d at 746.
3 Id. at 749. The Fourth Circuit had reservations in finding jurisdiction in
Richards in light of Executive Jet, but felt compelled to do since pleasure boats tradi-
tionally have been within admiralty jurisdiction. Id.
u 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973).
3 In Crosson, the plaintiff waterskier sued for personal injuries. 484 F.2d at 480.
This situation is distinguishable from a case like Lane where the presence or absence
of the skier has no effect on the claim involved.
529 F.2d at 180.
' But see Kaiser v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 487
F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1974); King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963);
where waterskiers were permitted to bring suits in admiralty.
JO See note 24 supra.
" 529 F.2d at 178.
12 See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra. The Fourth Circuit's decision accords
with the expression of intent in the communique from the Secretary of the Treasury,
see note 11 supra.
1977]
458 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
D. Maritime Lien Priority and the Ship Mortgage Act.
Admiralty law traditionally has provided certain creditors of an
insolvent ship owner remedial protection through maritime liens on
the ship itself.' Whether a debt is of a nature to cause a maritime lien
to attach is determined by examining general maritime law.,' the
Federal Maritime Lien Act,3 and state lien laws enforceable in admi-
ralty.4 In addition to these broad sources, the Ship Mortgage Act 5
provides a statutory right to mortgage liens.
Once established, a maritime lien must be ranked relative to the
liens of other claimants against the vessel. However, rules of lien
priority are settled only in general principle,' and are subject to varia-
' FED. R. Civ. P., Supplemental Rule C; Superseded Admiralty Rules of 1920 (as
amended), Rules 13-18. See 7A MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcriCE C.02 (2d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE].
2 The bulk of maritime lien claims come under the broad heading of general
maritime law, which includes salvage, The Steamboat Mayflower v. The "Sabine," 101
U.S. 384 (1880), general average, Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386 (1895), tort and non-
executory contract claims, 7A MOORE, supra note 1, at C.04.
46 U.S.C. §§ 971-75 (1970). The Federal Maritime Lien Act provides liens for
that class of creditors furnishing supplies, repairs, towage, dry dock use, or other
necessaries. Id. § 971.
State statutes creating liens largely were pre-empted by § 975 of the Federal
Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C. § 975 (1970), which provides that state statutes overlap-
ping the coverage of the federal Act shall be superseded by the Act. However, a few
state statutes still create lien rights where the federal statute does not; see generally
Grow v. Steel Gas Screw Lorraine K, 310 F.2d 547 (6th Cir. 1962), affg, 185 F. Supp.
803 (E.D. Mich. 1960), where Michigan law allowed a lien for an unpaid insurance
premium.
5 46 U.S.C. § 953 (1970).
1 Two basic doctrines control lien priority: the inverse priority rule, and the class
priority rule. 7A MOORE, supra note 1, at C.02; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY, § 9-85 [hereinafter cited as GiLMORE & BLACK]. The inverse priority rule
has long been a part of maritime law. The St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 409
(1824). Under this doctrine, the most recent liens receive first priority, while the
earliest liens are relegated to a subordinate position. Id. at 414. The doctrine is sup-
ported by two different theories: (1) that each lienor acquires a jus in re at the time
his lien attaches and becomes a co-proprietor of sorts in the res, thus subjecting his
claim to the next similar lien which attaches, The William Leishear, 21 F.2d 862, 863
(D. Md. 1927); and (2) that the last beneficial service is the one that continues the
viability of the ship as long as possible and therefore should be accorded preference.
Id. Also, beneficial additions subsequent to earlier liens theoretically add to the value
of the ship, which, in turn, should bring a higher price at the final sale. Thus, earlier
lienors are not deprived of the interest they had in the ship before the beneficial
addition. Id.; The Glen Island, 194 F. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
The class priority rule arranges liens according to the type of debt involved. The
theory behind the doctrine is that some liens have an inherent merit or comparative
righteousness which entitles them to preference. Connor, Maritime Lien Priorities:
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tions according to locality.' Currently, the common denominator is
the Ship Mortgage Act, which provides that preferred ship mortgages
have priority over all other liens except preferred maritime liens.' The
Act defines preferred maritime liens as those arising prior to record-
ing and endorsement of a mortgage, and liens for wages of a stevedore
or crew, general average, salvage, and damages arising out of tort
Application of the Ship Mortgage Act was the problem confront-
ing the Fourth Circuit in Oriente Commercial, Inc. v. M/V
Floridian." Oriente was one of several in rem claimants" against the
defendant merchant vessel, which had been arrested and sold by
court order in May of 1973.12 A judgment in default had been entered
in favor of Oriente on its claim that a shipment of meat was negli-
gently damaged in transit. 3 Black and Decker, Inc., the other appel-
lant in this action, also had received a default judgment on its claim
of negligent failure to deliver part of a shipment of machinery." In
Cross-Currents of Theory, 54 MICH. L. Rxv. 777, 791 (1956). Roughly, the order of
priority is as follows: (1) expenses of justice, (2) seamen's wages, (3) salvage and
general average, (4) torts, (5) preferred mortgages, (6) repairs and supplies, (7) cargo
damage, (8) state-created liens. Varian, Rank and Priority of Maritime Liens, 47 TuL.
L. REv. 751, 753 (1973); 7A MOORE, supra note 1, at C.02.
In combining the two basic priority doctrines, the majority of courts have held that
rank is dominant and that the inverse rule applies only within each class. The Samuel
Little, 221 F. 308 (2d Cir. 1915); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. The City of Athens, 83 F.
Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1949); The City of Tawas, 3 F. 170 (E.D. Mich. 1880). However, some
courts consider the inverse rule more important. The Odysseus m, 77 F. Supp. 297
(S.D. Fla. 1948); In re New England Transp. Co., 220 F. 203 (D. Conn. 1914). See
generally Varian, Rank and Priority of Maritime Liens, 47 TUL. L. REv. 751 (1973);
Comment, Developments in the Law of Maritime Liens, 45 TuI. L. REv 574 (1971);
Note, Priorities of Maritime Liens, 69 HARv. L. REv. 525 (1956).
7 District courts often have their own local rules which control some facet of lien
priority. See, e.g., United Virginia Bank/Citizens and Marine v. Oil Screw Sea Queen,
343 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Va. 1972).
All ship mortgages endorsed and recorded in accordance with the Ship Mortgage
Act are "preferred" and thus superior to all other liens except preferred maritime liens
and the expenses of justice. 46 U.S.C. §§ 922, 953 (1970).
46 U.S.C. § 953 (1970).
lo 529 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'g sub nom. Pierside Terminal Operators, Inc.
v. MN Floridian, 374 F. Supp. 27 (E.D..Va. 1974).
"1 Other in rem claimants in the action included Don Julio Corp. and Mike Cruz
Machine Shop, Inc., both claiming various amounts for repair work done to the vessel.
Pierside Terminal Operators, Inc. v. M/V Floridian, 374 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D. Va.
1974). The district court found their claims were inferior to the mortgage claims and
they did not appeal. Id. at 30.
12 529 F.2d at 221. For the procedure to enforce maritime liens, see generally 7A
MOORS, supra note 1, at C.03.
13 529 F.2d at 222.
" Id.
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addition to these claims, the United States held two preferred ship
mortgages on the vessel, on which the outstanding debt far exceeded
the proceeds from the ship's sale.1
5
Since the mortgage claims would exhaust the funds available, the
appellants sought to achieve priority over the preferred mortgages by
qualifying for preferred maritime lienholder status." To this end,
appellants brought their claims for cargo damage on the basis of tort,
which creates a preferred maritime lien, rather than on the basis of
contract, which is subordinate to preferred mortgages. 7 The district
court refused to allow the plaintiffs to bring their claims in tort, and
plaintiffs appealed. The sole issue before the Fourth Circuit was
whether claims for loss or damage of cargo can be brought as tort
actions rather than breach of contract actions, thereby qualifying
them as "preferred maritime liens" with priority over preferred mort-
gages. 8
The district court held that the purpose and policy considera-
tions5 of the Ship Mortgage Act require that cargo claims be subordi-
nated to valid mortgage claims."0 Moreover, the court pointed out,
without regard to the Ship Mortgage Act, that allowing cargo claims
to acquire preferred maritime lien status would give them priority
over claims for repairs, supplies, and other necessaries which tradi-
tionally are the preferred claims. 1 The court rejected claimants' ar-
15 Id.
11 374 F. Supp. at 29.
* See note 6 supra; text accompanying note 9 supra.
* Brief for Appellants at 1, 529 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1975).
* The policy of giving high priority to ship mortgages is designed to encourage
investment of capital in ship mortgages, and to promote public confidence in such
mortgages. Collier Advertising Serv., Inc. v. Hudson River Day Line, 14 F. Supp. 335
(S.D.N.Y. 1936), affd, 93 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1937); Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas
Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934). A further explanation supporting the district court's
position can be found in the report of the committee hearings on the bill. The report
states that the reason for preferring tort and salvage liens is that these are risks that
can be insured against by the mortgagor at the request of the mortgagee. Thus, these
claims would not deplete the security of the mortgagee. Contract claims, on the other
hand, usually are not insured against and consequently should be relegated to a posi-
tion inferior to that of the mortgagee. The objective is to put the mortgagee in a
position where he could have almost 100% security. Hearings on H.R. 9419 Before the
House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5 at
21 (1920).
21 374 F. Supp. at 31, 32.
21 Id.; see note 6 supra. The court also noted that repair or supply claimants rarely
will be able to bring a claim in tort, like the cargo claimant, because of the navigable
waters situs requirement in admiralty tort actions. 374 F. Supp. at 32.
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gument2 for permitting cargo damage claims in tort, and based its
decision on language in The St. Paul. 2 The lower federal court in St.
Paul divided cargo claims into two categories: pre-paid freight, and
other cargo claims. 4 The pre-paid freight claims were put in parity
with claims for repairs and supplies, thereby giving them priority
over other cargo claims.2 The St. Paul court reasoned that the policy
behind lien priority rules is to give priority to the creditors who confer
the greatest benefit on the ship in terms of service rendered; those
creditors should receive a high priority claim for keeping the ship in
service to the advantage of all creditors." Pre-paid freight, like re-
pairs or supplies, extends a benefit (cash) to the ship which prolongs
the operable life of the ship.Y Mere cargo damage creditors cannot
claim to have conferred any such beneficial service. In Oriente, the
appellants' authority for their priority status claim included cases
involving only pre-paid freight claims. 9 The district court in Oriente,
however, relied on the St. Paul theory that a higher equity inheres in
pre-paid freight claims that distinguishes them from cargo damage
claims.3 0
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held
that cargo damage claims may be brought as tort actions.3 The ap-
peals court criticized the lower court for failing to give sufficient
weight to case authority contrary to its position.2 Specifically, the
2 Claimants relied on The Henry W. Breyer, 17 F.2d 423 (D. Md. 1927); Morrisey
v. S.S. A. & J. Faith, 252 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio 1965). Claimants also cited to dictum
from The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113 (1898), a case which is dissimilar factually in
that it involved a claim for negligent towage.
277 F. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
21 Id. at 109-10.
2 Id.
21 Id.; see generally 7A MOORE, supra note 1, at T C.06; Connor, Maritime Lien
Priorities: Cross-Currents of Theory, 54 MICH. L. REv. 777, 810 (1956).
2 277 F. at 109, 110.
29 Id.
29 However, in one of the cases cited by appellants, The Henry W. Breyer, 17 F.2d
423 (D. Md. 1927), a cargo damage claim was involved as well as several pre-paid
freight claims. The district court distinguished this claim as a special case inapplicable
to Oriente because that claim arose prior to the recording of the mortgage. 374 F. Supp.
at 31 n.3. See note 9 supra. The appellants asserted, however, that the district court
had erred in this matter, and that the claim in Breyer in fact arose subsequent to the
mortgage, as did the claim in Oriente. The claimants thus contended that the cases
are indistinguishable. Brief for Appellants at 13 n.3, 529 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1975).
374 F. Supp. at 31.
3, 529 F.2d at 223.
= Id. at 222.
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Fourth Circuit pointed to dictum in The John G. Stevens" where the
Supreme Court stated that shippers could maintain an action in tort
against a carrier "for neglect to carry and deliver in safety." In
addition, the court quoted extensively from The Henry W. Breyer,5
in which a district court allowed cargo claims to be brought in tort.
The Breyer court treated the ship owner as a common carrier, holding
that "the owner of the goods damaged by the dereliction of a common
carrier has the option to bring action either in contract or in tort."3
Consequently, the cargo claims in Breyer were given priority over the
preferred mortgage.37 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit relied on Morrisey
v. S.S.A. & J. Faith,3 in which the district court held that cargo
claims may be brought in tort if the loss results from the carrier's
failure to exercise due diligence. " The Morrisey court derived its
standard for due diligence from the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,4"
which defines the rights, duties, and liabilities of maritime carriers.4
The Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's use of The St. Paul
as support for the position that cargo damage claims should not re-
ceive priority over preferred mortgages. Instead, the appellate court
asserted that St. Paul could be distinguished on its facts. 2 The dis-
tinguishing fact recited by the court-that the tort claims in St. Paul
were not allowed because they arose from a fire while the ship was in
court custody43-was immaterial however, to that portion of the hold-
ing relied upon by the district court. Rather, the critical part of the
St. Paul holding was that pre-paid freight claims were given priority
over cargo damage claims, and were equated with repair and supply
liens." Although these claims were all on the basis of contract, the
St. Paul court's reasoning with regard to the pre-paid freight and
- 170 U.S. 113 (1898). See note 22 supra.
" Id. at 124.
17 F.2d 423 (D. Md. 1927). See note 29 supra.
"' Id. at 429.
v Id.
1' 252 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
39 Id.
" 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970).
" Id. at § 1303. The Act provides that a carrier must exercise due diligence to
provide a seaworthy vessel.
42 529 F.2d at 223.
13 All of the claims in The St. Paul were for cargo damage as a result of a fire
aboard the ship while the ship was in court custody. The tort claims were denied
because the evidence did not warrant a finding of negligence, as well as the fact that
a lien cannot arise while the ship is in the custody of a Marshall. 277 F. at 109. Contract
liens were allowed because they arose at the time of the contract. Id. at 106.
1 Id. at 109-10.
